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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

H.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
In March of 1995, recently widowed and 25 year old Tifani Clement (Tifani) met with

A.G. Edwards agent Gene Gillette (Gillette) about investing life insurance proceeds obtained as a

'

result of her husband's death. Gillette established "non-tax qualified" annuity insurance
accounts for Tifani's small children? Tifani and her future husband, Jared Wattenbarger (Jared),
later discovered that the accounts contained severe tax consequences and transfer restrictions if
funds were withdrawn prior to when the children reached the age of 59% and would have been
worth much more had the funds been invested as instructed by TifanL3After A.G. Edwards (now
Wells Fargo) refused to remedy the problem, Tifani and Jared brought an action in District
~ o u r t A.G.
. ~ Edwards has yet to answer the allegations and instead moved the court to remove
the action to arbitration based on an arbitration provision found in an entirely separate agreement
than the annuity insurance

contract^.^

The district court held that a mandatory arbitration

provision found in an earlier and completely separate IRA contract that Tifani had with A.G.
Edwards required all disputes between Tifani and AGE be resolved through binding arbitration
and subsequently dismissed Tifani and Jared's action. Based upon that same contract, the district

' R. Vol. I, p. 7
id.
R. Vol 11. pp. 96, 129
See Compl. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-15

R. Vol I. P. 51
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court awarded A.G. Edwards $15,197.41 attorney fees and costs.6 This appeal addresses the
court's decision to dismiss the case and its awarding of attorney fees.
11.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On December 20,2007, Jared and Tifani Wattenbarger filed a complaint against A.G.

Edwards (now "Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC") and Gillette alleging professional malpractice and
fraud.7 In a September 3,2008, status conference, the Honorable Greg Anderson ordered that the
plaintiffs request an answer from the defendants or take default judgment.' On October 7,2008,
the defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel
~rbitration."~
The motion relied upon Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 12(b)(l) and (6) for its motion to
dismiss and I.C. $ 7-902 (of the Uniform Arbitration Act) for its motion to stay and compel
arbitration.'' The defendants filed affidavits in support of its motion." A hearing was held in
regard to the motion on December 4,2008, wherein Judge Anderson requested supplemental
briefs in regard to the "appropriate standard to apply."'* The district court filed a "Memorandum
Decision" on January 22,2009, granting defendants' motion to dismiss. l 3 On the same day, the
court filed another "Memorandum Decision" stating in its conclusion that plaintiffs' "claims

%.Vol. 11, pp. 172, 190, R. Vol. 111, p. 312

'R. Vo1. I, pp. 4-15
R. Vol. I, p. I8
R. Vol. I, pp. 51-52

id.

lo

R. Vol. I, pp. 54-91
l2

R. Vol. 11, p. 55

l3

R. Vol. 11, p. 172
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should be submitted to arbitrati~n."'~On March 5,2009, the plaintiffs filed a "notice of
appeal.IS
On February 5,2009, the defendants filed a "Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and
Attorneys' Fees" requesting an award of $18,883.91, relying on ldaho Rule oCCiv Pro 54 (d) and
(e), Idaho statutes and an arbitration clause for its authority.lG0niipril 6,2009, the court
awarded the defendants the full requested amount of attorney's fees in the amount of $15,139.41
and an additional $58.00 in costs as a "matter of right."

l7

The court rejected the defendants'

argument that there was a statutory right to the costs and instead relied entirely on a contractual
clause as a basis for its ruling.18 On April 8. 2009, the plaintiffs amended their appeal to include
to challenge the Court's decision awarding fees and

1x1.

FACTS.

In September of 1994, Tifani Clement's young husband, Shan Clement, died as a result
of an accident." Tifani was 25 years old at the time, with a
expecting another child

l4

R. Vol. 11, p. 190
R. VOI.111, pp. 268-270

l6

R. Vo1. 11, pp. 199-202

" R. Vol.

111, p. 323

R. Vol. 111, pp. 312-322
l9

R. Vo1. 111, p. 325

20

R. VOI.11, p. 93
R. Vol. 11, p. 2
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who was born in

and
" Fortunately,

Shan had obtained a $200,000 life insurance

Sometime during March of 1995,A.G.

Edwards agent Gillette initiated contact with Tifani to offer services on investing the life
insurance proceeds?3
During her meeting with Gilletle, Tifani told GilleMe her desires for the proceeds,
including an investment of $15,000 for each of her children to be utilized for funding their future
college education and church missions."

Tifani had no experience in investing and relied

entirely upon Gillelte's experience and knowledge.25 Gillette subsequentljr established a "non
tax qualified variable and fixed group annuity contract" (Fixed Insurance Annuity) for each of
the children with an initial deposit of $15,000.2~Acting upon Gillette's advice, Tifani made an
additional deposit of $4,000 to these accounts several months later ub 1995.'~
To establish the Fixed Insurance Annuities, Gillette had Tifani complete a "new account
card" for her and each of her ~hildren.2~
She is listed as the c u ~ t o d i a n The
. ~ ~ card contains no
agreement or reference to any agreement regarding arbitrati~n.~'Tifani was also required to

ZZ

R. Vol. I, p. 6

23

R. Vo1. 11, pp.94-95

24

Id.

25

Id.

2"d.
27

R. VOI.I, p. 8

28

R. Vol. 11, pp. 95-96,98-100

29

Id.

30

Id.
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complete and sign an "application" for the Fixed Insurance Annuities (FIAS)?' The application
lists Tifani as the "annuitant" and "custodian" for her children?' The application contains no
provision or reference to an arbitration ~lause.3~
The "certificate specifications" received in
regard to the FIAs list the children

as the "annuitants" and Tifani as the

"participant."34
The terms and conditions of the FIAs are stated in a document entitled "Flexible Payment
Deferred Combination Variable and Fixed Croup Annuity Contract ~ o n ~ a r t i c i ~ a t i This
n~."~~
contract lacks an arbitration clause or requirement for the resolving of disputes, instead stating
with regard to jurisdiction that: "This contract and all Certificates issued in connection with it
will be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction where the Contract Application is signed," or
Idaho in this case.36
. 3 ~ and Jared desired to
In December of 1999, Tifkni married Jared ~ a t t e n b a r ~ e r Tifani
merge their respective investments?' Jared's investor reviewed the FIAs, and informed the
Wattenbargers about the severe restrictions and tax consequences if the annuities were drawn

j'

R. Vol. 11, pp. 102-104

j2

Id.

j3

Id.

j"d.
j5

R. VOI.11, pp. 106-107

36

Id.

37

R. Vo1. 11, p.96

38

Id.
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from prior to

urning the age of fifty nine and one half.39The Wattenbargers

also learned that had the money been properly invested, that the accounts would have been much
more valuable.40
The Wattenbargers obtained counsel who wrote to A.G. Edwards requesting that the
investment errors be remedied:'

After A.G. Edwards rejectetl this request, the Wattenbargers

filed a complaint in Bonneville County alleging negligence and fraud.42The defendants did not
formally answer the allegations, and, after some prodding by the court to answer the allegations,
In
instead filed a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel ~rbitration."~~
Attached to the affidavit
support of its motion, the defendants filed an affidavit by ~illette.4~
were copies of documents not kept by Gillette or Tifani which apparently until after the initiation
of the lawsuit were buried deep within the company's microfiche archives in St. Louis,
These documents included a "New Account Card" for an "IRAISEP Adoption

"R. Vol. I, pp. 8-9, R. Vol. 11. pp. 96, 127-128

" R. Vol. I, p. 9
" Id.
42

See Plaintiffs Compl.

43

R. Vol. I. p. 18, R. VOII. pp. 51-53

" R. Vol. I, pp. 54-91
45

Prior to filing this lawsuit, Wattenbargers sent several inquiries to Gene Gillette and A.G. Edwards, one of which
was for a copy of all records on file at their office. (See Complaint R. Vol. I. p. 10.) In fact, no copies of written
agreements between the parties including the above-described documents were kept in Gillette's office or were
sent by A.G. Edwards main office. (Id.) The first time Wattet~bargersbecame aware of any documents regarding
the IRA Agreement containing an arbitration provision was in a Feb. 28,2008, letter from defendants' counsel,
Howard Bumett, two months afier the initiation ofthe lawsuit. (See R. Vol. 111. Pp. 292-296.) Burnett indicates
that he had "just received" the documents, that these were "scanned" documents from A.G. Edward's main office
and that he was still awaiting further "background documents" from the company. (Id. at 296) According to the
"legal services" description notes submitted by Hawley Troxel, counsel received "additional documents" from
A.G. Edwards after February 28,2008. (Id. at pp. 241-44) It is readily apparent that the records regarding both
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Agreement" (IRA New Account Card) and an "1RAA.G. Edwards (custodian) Self-Directed
Individual Retirement Account Disclosure Statement and Custodial Agreement" (IRA

The IRA New Account Card contains handwritten entries, listing "Tifani Clement" as
"depositor" and ""San Clement" as "primary beneficiary."47 There is a handwritten signature of
"Tifani Clement" on the document with the handwritten date of March 3 1, 1993.48 The "amount
of contribution" is listed as $ 2 5 0 . ~Tifani
~
vaguely recalled setting up an IRA with A.G. Edwards
along with her husband Shan prior to his death.50 She had no recollection or knowledge of ever
receiving or reviewing the IRA Agreement and made no contributions to the IRA ac~ount.~'
The new account card states that it is an "IRA Adoption Agreement" and references a:
binding and enforceable arbitration provision on page 21 in paragraph 12 of Article XI1
of the Custodial Account ~ ~ r e e m e n t . "
The first line of page one of the IRAAgreement declares the following:
The Disclosure Statement is a general review of the basic rules and federal tax
considerations regarding your A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Individual Retirement Account.
(emphasis added.)53
the IRA and Fixed Insurance Annuity accounts were not known or ever referred to by the parties involved, and
required an extensive archival search to find.
" R. VOI. I, pp. 62-92

" R. Val. I. p. 63
48

Id.

49

Id.

50

R. Vol. I, p. 94

5'

Id.

52

R. Val. I, p. 63

53

R. Val. I, p. 66
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Page 15 of the IRAAgreeinent is a "Custodial Account Agreement" with the following preface:
This Agreement is entered into by and between each individual who executes an
Adoption Agreement (attached hereto) incorporating this Agreement (the "Depositor")
and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (the "Custodian") . . .
The Depositor desires to establish an individual retirement account (the "account") as
described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended or any
successor statute ("the Code"). (Emphasis added)54
Of critical note, the IRA Agreement places quotations around "account" indicating that
any reference to "account" in the document is a specific reference to "an individual retirement
account as described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19~6."'~The entire 27
page IRA Agreement, including the "Custodial Account Agreement" sets forth the rules,
procedures, rights, etc... administering the IRA account established by A.G. Edwards pursuant to
Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code. No other types of accounts are addressed or even
referenced in the
Paragraph 13, Article XII, of the IRA Agreement (not paragraph 12 as indicated in the

IRA New Account Card) contains the following:
The Depositor agrees and, by carrying any account for the Depositor, the Custodian
agrees that all controversies between the Depositor and the Custodian or any of the
Custodian's present or former officers, directors, agents or em loyees which may arise
for any cause whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration.

57

*".

Vol. I, p 80

55

Note the distinction of quotations between "account" and "the code" (referencing the IRS code section.) The
quotations are around both "the" and code," whereas "account" is the only tern in quotations, not "the account."

56

Id.

" R.

Val. I, p. 86
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The paragraph further states:
At least one oftlie arbitrators appointed to hear any controversy to be settled by
arbitration shall be currently en~ployedfull time by a member organization of the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., unless otherwise agreed in writing prior to the time of the
arbitsation.
This arbitration provision shall apply to any controversy or claim or issue in any
controversy arising froin events which occurred prior,'on or subsequent to h e execution
of this arbitration agreement. This arbitration provision shall be interpreted according to
federal law and the Federal Arbitration Act. The award of the arbitrators, or the majority
of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered into any
court, state or federal, having j~sisdiction.~~
In regard to attorney fees the IRAAgreement states the following in paragraph 10 of Article XII:
Any expense, including attorney's fees, incurred by the Custodian in defense in an action
brought by the Depositor seeking rescission of any agreement between the Depositor and
the Custodian or to recover damages for the activities of the Custodian or its agents or
employees in handling any account of the Depositor shall be borne solely by the account,
or the Depositor as the case may be, should the Custodian prevail.59
On the final page (27) of the IRAAgreement, the document indicates that: "A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc. has adopted the foregoing instrument this 3 lStday of December 1988 by:"
an illegible handwritten signature.60 There also appears "ATTEST:" followed by an illegible
At the bottom of the page is the statement: "Reprinted June 15, 1992."~' There are
no references in the IRA Agreement to Tifani Clement or the IRA New Account

58

id.

59

R. Vol I, p. 85

60

R. Vol. 1, p. 92

6'

Id.

62

Id.

63

R. Vol. I, pp. 63-92
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I[$SUES PmSENTED ON APPEAL
The District Court erred regarding its January 22,2009, Memorandum Decisions Re:
Motion to Dismiss Or, in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel Arbitration.
a. The District Court esred in applying the wrong rule under an Idaho Rule Civ Pro
12(b) motion for determining whether Jared and Tifani Wattenbarger had
contsaclually agreed under the 1993 IRA Agreement to arbitrate tort claims
arising from separate 1995 FIAs that were entered into on behalf of the children,

b. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that Tifani and Jared
Wattenbarger agreed to arbitrate their claims.
c. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that their tort claims emanating
from 1995 FIAs that contained no arbitration provisions were subject to, or
"within the scope" of an arbitration provision arising out of a 1993 IRA
Agreement;
d. The Court improperly found as a matter of law that the arbitration clause is not
unconscionable and invalid for public policy reasons;
The District Court erred regarding its April 6,2009, Decision Re: Memorandum of Costs,
Disbursements, and Attorneys' Fees.
a.

In failing to conduct the appropriate analysis under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro
54(d)(l), the Court failed to cany out its discretionary duties.

b.

The Court errantly or failed to apply the legal standards.

Appellants' Brief 10

c.

The Court errantly found that there was a contractual basis for recovery of
attorney fees and costs.

d.

The Court's awarding of costs to Defendant when Defendant has yet to address
the merits of the case and Plaintiffs claims are still viable but in a different forum
is unjust and counter to the objectives of Idah6 Rules of Civ Pro.

e.

The Court awarded excessive fees and costs to Defendant.

Appellants' Brief 11

ARGUMENT
1.

PgEQUESTED RELIEF*

Pursuant to the arguments below, the appellants request the following relief &omthe Court:
A) that the case be remanded to the district court for the proper consideration o f the facts

and law under the summary judgment standard, and
B) i f the district court finds under a summary judgment standard that the Wattenbargers
agreed to the arbitration provision in the IRA Agreement, that the district court be further
instructed that in order for the Wattenbargers' claims to be subject to arbitration that such claims
must be within the scope of the IRA Agreement, which means that the claims must be related to
the subject matter o f and raise some issue the resolution o f which requires reference to or
construction o f the IRA Agreement itself.
Or, alternatively, that the Court determine as a matter of law (pursuant to a "de novo" review of
the facts and law) that either:
A) the Wattenbargers never contracted to arbitrate their claims,
B) Wattenbargers' claims are not "within the scope" o f the agreement containing the

arbitration provision, or
C) The arbitration clause is invalid for public policy reasons, either for its
unconscionability or violation of consumer protections.
Watttenbargers also request that the Court overturn the district court's award of attorney fees.

Appellants' Brief 12

A. A Rule 12@) motion where evidence is presented outside ofthe pleadings is treated
as a motion for summary judgment and is reviewed "de novo " by the appellate court.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12bPursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rule of Civ Pro,

"If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." See, Losser v.

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,673,183 P.3d 758,761 (2008); Rudzik v Shefleer, 134 Idaho 141,143,
997 P.2d 602,605 (2000); McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,151 937 P.2d 1222,1225 (1997).
The standard of review on an appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same as
the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Caldwell v.

Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120,123 968 P.2d 215,218 (1998). In an appeal of ruling
regarding Rule 12(b)(6) motion supported by evidence, the court "reviews the record before the
district court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine

de novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
there exists any genuine issues if material fact and whether the successful movant below is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. U S .R. ?l Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795,798,
118 P.3d 127, 130, (2005). The appellate court should review the district court's ruling as a
motion for summary judgment, even if the district court failed to follow summary judgment
standard of review. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,626, 151 P.3d 818,822 (2007)
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to
Appellants' Brief 13

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAIHOR.
OF CIV.19

56(c); G&MFarnzs v. FunkIrrigation Go., 119 Idaho 514,516-17,808 E42d 851,853-

54 (1991). When assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court must draw a11 facts and
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.) 119 Idaho at 517,808 [92d at 854 ;Sanders v.

Kuna Joint Sck. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156'(Ct. App.1994); Haessley v. Safeco
ntle ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463,825 P.2d 1119 (1992). When assessing a motion for
summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Dodge-Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs., Co., 137 Idaho 838,841,54 P.3d 954,957
(Ct. App. 2002).

B. The appellate courd is permitted to exercise a ' y e e review" oftke law.
In an appeal, there are no harriers to the court in exercising its own review of the trial
court's conclusions of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 194, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002).
Moreover, the Court is "free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented." BHA Inv. Co.

v. Idaho, 138 Idaho 348,351,63 P.3d 474,477 (2003) q'ting Kootenai Elec. Coop. v. Washington
Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432,435,901 P.2d 1333,1336 (1995). The Court also exercises a
free review of "matters of law." Ackevman v. Bonneville Couny, 140 Idaho 307, 310, 92 P.3d
557,560 (2004). Included in its free review are rulings regarding whether the court lacks
jurisdiction. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619,621, 115 P.3d 710,712 (2005).

111. THE DHSTIRBCT COURT FAILED TO PERCEWIE ITS HPEVIEW OF THE
MOTION TO DISMISS AS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
During the course of the proceedings the district court requested supplemental
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proceedings in regard to the "appropriate standard to apply." 64 Wattenbargers' supplemental
brief advised the Court of its duty under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 12(b) that when "matters outside
of the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he treated as one
for summary judgment . . . ."65 The court rejected this authority by improperly citing language
from Lovey v. Xegence Blueshield qfdaho, 139 Idaho 37,72 P.3d 877 (2003). 66 The district
court incorrectly stated that under Lovey "any factual findings in determining arbitrahility (sic)
must be supported by substantial and competent evidence." (citing Lovey at 41 and 881.) In fact,
the citation from Lovey states: "When reviewing an unconscionability determination made by the
trial court, we must accept the factual findings made by the trial court, as long as they are
supported by substanifad,competent evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the authority cited
by the court has no bearing on the standard of review.
Thus, the district court did no analysis pursuant to the summaryjudgment standard in its
review. It is necessary for this Court to correct this error. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,
626, 151 P.3d 818,822. Although this appeal is primarily based on matters of law, there are
critical disputed factual issues that if construed under the summary judgment standard generate
triable issues about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the subject claims. Goodman v.

Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,626, 151 P.3d 818, 822. This Court should vacate and remand this case

" See December 4,2008, Minute Ently, R. Vol. 11p.156
65

See Plaintiffs Supp. Brief dated December 11, 2008, R. Vol. I1 p. 167

66 See Jan. 22,2009,

Mern. Dec., R. Vol. II p. 176
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because the district court improperly perceived its r0le.6~
The critical controverted facts are as follows : 1. Tifani Wattenbarger had no recollection
or knowledge ofthe IRA Agreement containing the arbitration provision.68 2. A.G. Edwards and
Gillette had no knowledge of the documents purporting to require arbitration until they were
"found" in a scanned archive after the complaint had been filed.69 3. The actual document
containing the arbitration clause is contained within a separate document (IRA Agreement) from
the IRANew Account Card bearing Tifani's name.7o4. The IRAAgreement has no reference
whatsoever to Tifani or the IRANew Account ~ a r d . 5.
~ 'Although the IRANew Account Card
makes reference to a "Custodial Account Agreement" and references a "binding and enforceable
arbitration provision on page 21 in paragraph 12 of Article XI1 of the Custodial Account
the actual "binding and enforceable" arbitration provision is found in paragraph
13. This raises the distinct possibility that the document referred to in the IRA New Account
Card and which the defendants based their entire motion to dismiss and compel was in actuality
not produced as evidence in Court, and may in fact no longer exist. If there is even a possibility
that this is true, the dismissal should be vacated.
There are myriad factual issues that the district court failed to recognize as material and

67 It

is unclear from the district court's decisions if it in fact recognized that summary judgment standards applied in
this case.
68 R. Vol. 11, p. 94
69

R. Vol. I. p. 6, R. Vol. 111, pp. 292.296

70 See generally the
71

IRA Agreement

Id.

" See IRA New Account Card, R. Vol. I, p. 63
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in dispute. Whether the parties had in,fact agreed to arbitration is a factual issue that the district
court should have recognized required determination pursuant to a summary judgment standard.

THE DISTRICT COURT 1MPWBPERTB;BTAPPLIED LOVEY K REGENCE BLUE
SHIELD OF IDABO

I&:

The bulk of the district court decision rests on the side-stepping the holdings of the
leading Idaho case in regard to the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements, Lovey v.

Regence Blueshield ofIdaho, 139 Idaho 37,72 P.3d 877.73 The Lovey court engages in a rather
detailed analysis of what claims "arising out of or relating to" a contract with an arbitration
clause is subject to arbitration. Id Howeve< the district court avoids this analysis by pointing out
a distinction between the arbitration language reviewed in Lovey and the language found the IRA
Agreement. The Court rationalizes that because the words "out of or relating to" the agreement
do not appear in the IRA Agreement arbitration clause, the scope as defined by Lovey does not
apply, and therefore every conceivable case or controversy that could ever occur between
Wattenbargers and the defendants or their agents - before or after the inception of the IRA
Agreement infinitem is subject to arbitrati~n.~~
Although the IRA Agreement does not contain the exact wording of the clause analyzed
in Lovey, the language in the respective clauses is essentially the same. Both the express and
implied terms of the IRA Agreement itself and its governing statute, as well as public policy
considerations, do limit the scope of the arbitration clause. As detailed below, it is abundantly

73

See Jan. 22,09, Mem. Dec. R.Vol. I1 pp. 176-191

74

Id.
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clear that the scope of arbitration is not boundless as the district court suggests.
A. The terms oftke IRA Agreement itselflimit the claims subject to arbilration to those
arising,fi.omthe "carrying" ofthe IRA "accounts. "
The initial task in considering a motion to compel arbitration is to determine 1) whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate and 2) the scope of that agreement. Amodio v Blindec Robinson &

Co., 715 F. Supp 32,33 (D. Conn. 1989). Arbitration "is a matter of contract and a party cannot
be required to submit to arbitration of any dispute he has not agreed so to submit." Howsam v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Znc., 537 U.S. 79, 82 (2002) q'ting Steelworks v. Warrior & GzalfNav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574,582 (1960). In determining the scope ofthe contract, the court should
consider "the circumstances under which the agreement was made." Efund Capital Partners v.

Robert Pless, 150 Cal. App. 4" 1311, 1322 (Cal. App. 2007) The court must also ascertain
whether the party seeking arbitration is "making a claim on which itsface is governed by the
parties contract." Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 P.3d 944,948 (2007)(emphasis
added). "Whether an arbitration clause in a contract requires arbitration of a particular dispute or
claim depends on its terms." Id. (emphasis added)
Even if Tifani agreed to arbitrate IRA disputes, the IRA Agreement and its arbitration
only pertains to A.G. Edwards's administration of the IRA accounts established for its customer,
therefore limiting the claims that would be subject to arbitration. Page 1 of the IRAAgreement
clearly limits its scope, stating that it is:
a general review of the basic rules and federal tax considerations regardin your A. G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc. Individual Retirement Account. (emphasis added.)

IW

R.Vol. I, p. 66
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The entire 27 page IRA Agreement and the "'Custodial Account Agreement" limits its
application to IRA accounts under "Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code."'"

The

agreement does not contemplate any other type of accounts. In fact, "account" is defined on
Page 15 as "an individual retirement account as described in section 408(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended or any successor statute ("the ode")."'^^
The IRA Agreement's use of quotations around "account" indicates that any reference to
"account" in the document is a specific reference to a Section 408(a) IRA account. The fact that
the quotations are around "account" and not "the account" (as is the case with "the code")
suggests that "account" as referenced in the document refers to the possibility of one or more
"individual retirement accounts as described in section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986" and not other types of accounts for which there is no definition of in the agreement.
At the very least, the fact that quotations are around the article "the" in "the code" and
not the article "the" in the "account" suggests an ambiguity because the quotation marks are
"reasonably subject to conflict in its interpretation." Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835
P.2d 677, 684 (1992). Ambiguities in a contract are construed against the drafter, which in this
case is A.G. Edwards. Morgan v, Firestone 1;:re& Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506,201 P.2d 976
(1948) Therefore, even if the quotation marks are ambiguous, construing the ambiguity against
the drafter, the word ''account" as it appears in the document refers to one or more Section

'*' See general IRA Agreement
Is2

R. VOI. I, p. 80
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408(a) IRA accounts as defiIled on page 15 of the agreement.
Hence, the first line of Paragraph 13, Article XII, found on page 2 1 of the IRAAgreement

- of which the defendants based their entire motion states the following:
The Depositor agrees and, by carrying any account for the Depositor, the Custodian
agrees that all controversies behveen the Depositor and the Custodian or any of the
Custodian's present or former officers, directors, agents or employees which ma arise
for any cause whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration. (emphasis added)IY3
The key phrase in this provision is "by carrying any account (defined as IRA account) for
the Depositor" which establishes the scope of this arbitration provision and therefore the
limitation of the claims subject to arbitration. This reference to the "carrying of any (IRA
account)" combined with the singular references throughout the document to Section 408(a)
lRAs has essentially the same meaning as "arising from or relating to" the contract. In
considering the plain meaning of the its terms and the circumstances under which the document
was agreed to, there is no other reasonable interpretation of the document and its provisions other
than that it relates exclusively to IRA accounts - as suggested by its very title: "IRA A.G.
Edwards (custodian) Self-Directed Individual Retirement Account Disclosure Statement and
" ~ Capital Partners v. Robert Pless, 150 Cal. App. 4" 1311, 1322
Custodial ~ ~ r e e m e n t . "Efund
Under this interpretation of the IRA Agreement, even under the broad parameters of

Lovey the scope of the arbitration provision ends with claims, including torts, that do not involve
the "carrying" of Tifani's IRA accounts withA.G. Edwards. The Lovey court states that the
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scope of the arbitration clause depends "on the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of
the arbitration clause" and at a minimum must "raise some issue the resolution of which requires
reference to or construction of the contract itself." Lovey, 139 Idaho at 47, 72 P.3d at 887.15'
Wattenbargers' claims have nothing whatsoever to do with the IRA accounts, "the subject
matter" of the arbitration provision, nor to the IRAAgreement or "contract itself." Id. In fact, the
claims involved FIAs entered into through a separate and distinctly different new account card,
separate applications, and controlling documents none of which contain any arbitration
provisions or reference lo any previous agreements, including the ~ ~ ~ ~ g r e e m e n t . ' ~ ~
Moreover, A.G. Edwards does not "carry" the annuities. Although A.G. Edwards
established the annuities, the annuities are managed or "carried? by Sun Life Assurance, 1r1c.l~~
Thus, even if the definition of "account" is not restricted to IRAaccounts, the arbitration
provision still does not apply because the account that is the subject matter of the Wattenbargers'
claims is not "carried" by A.G. Edwards.

'51

'sI
lS7

In it's Jan. 22,2009, decision, the district court errantly refers a California case cited in Lovey as Idaho's
"adoption" that if the confract merely "creates a relationship" then the arbitration provision applies to all future
claims between the parties. Again, the district court fails to correctly or fully cite the Lovey decision. Lovey
makes it clear later on it its decision that a relationship creation is not enough, but that the claim must be least bear
some relationship to the "subject matter" of the contract and it must "at a minimum, raise some issue the
resolution of which requires reference to or construction of some portion of the contract itself." (as cited above)
see the exhibits to aff. of Tifani Wattenbarger, R. Vol. 11, pp. 98-1 10
11. R.VOI.pp. 106-107. This makes the district court's analysis that much more suspect. In fact, the annuity
contract at issue is ultimately with a third party. In an even more sophistic twist, the district court then uses this
third party contractual relationship to deny a pledge of the annuity in lieu of a bond 011 appeal, because A.G.
Edwards purportedly has no control over the funds.
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B. The governing statute of the arbitration clause, the Federal Arbitration Act, expressly
provides that arbitration clauses are only enforceable for claims "arising under the
contracI.'
The arbitration clause in this case is to be '"nterpreted according to federal law and the
Federal Arbitration Act." (FAA) 2 USCS $ 1, et al. The FAAprovides:

A writlen provi.sion in . . . a contract. . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereajer
arising out of such contract. . ..shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceuble, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (emphasis
added) 9 USCS $ 2
The statute is explicit that a "valid" or "enforceable" arbitration clause is a 'kitten
provision in . . . a contract. . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereajer arising out of such

contract."'58Id. Thus, by law, such clauses are only valid or enforceable for claims which "arise
out of the contract" that contains them.
Consistent with this interpretation, Federal courts have indicated that arbitration clauses
found within a contract are not "independent contracts." Such an analysis is contained within a
Sixth Circuit decision Glazer v Lehmen Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444 (6thCir. 2005). In referencing
several previous decisions including from the U.S. Supreme, the Court concludes that although
an arbitration clause can be considered separately in terms of enforceability, the clause is not an
"independent contract" nor should be "considered a separate contract" from the contract in which
it is contained. Id. at 453-54.
Accordingly, courts have consistently held when two separate contracts exist, one which

'51

The term "maritime transaction" and its references in the section are omitted because they does not apply to the
facts of this case
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contains an arbitration clause and one which does not, the contract which contains the arbitration
does not control claims "arising out of' of the contract which does not contain the arbitration
clause. See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 2000)(holding that consulting
agreement and settlement agreements were independent agreements and therefore the arbitration
agreement in the settlement agreement could not be applied to claims arising from the consulting
agreement). See also Alticor Inc. I/:Nut '1 Union Fire Ins. Co. qfpittsburgh, PA, 41 1 F.3d 669 (6'
Cir. 2005) (holding that an arbitration provision in an ancillary agreement to an insurance policy
could not enforced to a claim regarding an "occurrence" under the insurance agreement.)
In this case, although the arbitration clause in the IRAAgreement does not contain
"arising out of," as interpreted by the FAA, the arbitration clause is only enforceable as to claims
that "arise out of' the IRAAgreement. This would not include claims arising out of different
contract even though it may involve some of the same parties. See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233
F.3d 720, 727 See, al.~oAlticor,41 1 F.3d at 669. Wattenbargers' claims arise out of FIAs
contracts, thus the IRA Agreement arbitration provision does not apply. Further, the defendants
cannot claim that the arbitration clause was a "separate" or "independent" contract than the IRA
Agreement. See Glazer v Lehmen Brothers, Inc., 394 F.3d 444 The arbitration provision is part of
the IRA Agreement, that's all. The Wattenbargers' claims in regard to the FIAs do not "arise" out
of the IRAAgreement. They arise out of a separate contract and set of circumstances.

C. That the arbitration clause should apply to claims arising out of the contract is an
implied term.
This Court has recognized that "a contract includes not only what is stated expressly but
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also that which of necessity is implied from its language." Scott 12 Castle, 104 Idaho 719,723,
662 P.2d 1163, 1167 (61. App. 1983). As .further explained, there is a "general rule of contract"
that "terms are to be implied in a contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are
necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them
and have only failed to express them because of sheer inadveizence or because they axe too
obvious to need expression." Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 223,231,
939 P.2d 542,550 (1997). Such implied terms "arise from the specific circumstances under
which the contract was made." Id. Further, these "implied terms are as much a part of the
contract as those which are expressed." Id.
In this case, given that the IRAAgreement deals entirely with IRA Accounts managed by
A.G Edwards, it should be easily or "obviously" implied that the arbitration provision within that
agreement would apply to claims arising from that agreement. Id. The fact that the arbitration
clause is to be "interpreted" according to the FAA which, as previously discussed, enforces
arbitration agreements for controversies "arising out of' the contract is further implication that
the clause applies only to the IRA Agreement. Id. The circumstances surrounding the IRA
Agreement was that Tifani had agreed to establish an IRA account with A.G Edwards, and that
the documents contained the governance and administrative procedures for that account. By
implication, all of the terms within those documents relate solely to the IRA. Again, the scope of
both the "express" and "implied" telms of the contract including its arbitration do not cover
Wattenbargers' claims and their appeal should therefore be granted.
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D. The district court erred in holding that Jared Walfenbargeragreed to arbitrate the
claims.
The district c o w held that Jared Wattenbarger is subject to the arbitration provision that
he did not sign, citing cases under the principles of agency where spouses cannot escape liability
because the other spouse signed the agreement. However, the facts in this matter are
dramatically difterent than the cases cited by the district court. In March of 1993,Qfani was not
married to Jared. To this point, Wattenbargers have not been able to find any "spousal agency"
cases under these extraordinary set of facts - i.e., can a woman married at the time of an
agreement bind a future spouse to that agreement, particularly if the woman does not yet know
the spouse that she would be binding in the future? This may therefore be a case of first
impression for the Court. Iiowever, it stands to reason that agency should not reach that far into
the futwe, and Tifani had no express or apparent authorization to bind a future husband. Thus
Jared, whatever his claims might be, is not bound by the arbitration agreement.

THE AmITIPthIFION CLAUSE ]IS INVALID AS A MATTER OF PUBLlC
V.
POLICY.
A. The arbitration clause as interpreted without limitation is unconscionable.
Both the defendants and the district court have construed the arbitration clause to literally
cover each and every possible "controversy, claim or issue" between Tifani and any current or
former "employee" or "agent" 0fA.G. Edwards arising "prior" or "subsequent" to the 1993
agreement.'59 One of the arbitrators must be a member of the New York Stock Exchange, 1nc.160

The District Court's Jan. 22 2009, R. Vol 11. pp. 178 states that the arbitration clause: "requires that all litigation
arising from any event between A.G. Edwards and Tifani be arbitrated."

Appellants' Brief 25

The breadth of this arbitration clause is staggering and on its face unconscionable, against public
policy and should be invalidated.
In Idaho, for a contractual provision to be voided as unconscionable, it must be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability relates to the
bargaining process leading to the to the agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses
upon the terms of the agreement itself. Zovey v. Regence Blueshield ofIdaho, 139 Idaho 37,42,
72 P.3d 777,882 The elements of procedural unconscionability are laid out in the Lovey:
Procedural unconscionability may arise when the contract "was not the result of free
bargaining between the parties.". . . Indicators of procedural unconscionability generally
fall into two areas: lack of voluntariness and lack of knowledge. Lack of voluntariness
can be shown by factors such as the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression or
threats short of duress, or by great imbalance on the parties' bargaining power with the
stronger party's terms being nonnegotiable and the weaker party being prevented by
market factors, timing, or other pressures from being able to contract with another party
on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all. Lack of knowledge can be
shown by iaclc of understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use of
inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic language, the lack of
opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms, or disparity in the
sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties, (citations omitted) Id.
The district court correctly stated these elements of procedural unconscionability found in

Lovey in its decision. However, instead of applying the elements directly to the facts of this case,
the Court instead compared the analysis of the facts of the Lovey case with the facts of the
current c a ~ e . " ' ~Recognizing
'
that each case presents its own set of unique circumstances and
facts, the Court should have conducted a review of the specific facts and circumstances regarding

R. Vol. I. p. 21
16'

See the court's analysis, R. Vol. 11, pp. 183-185
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the bargaining position of the parties in the current case as applied to the elements of procedural
unconscionability.
The district court while ostensibly noting that this case involves an "adhesion contract"
between the parties, it dismissed that factor almost out of hand. While the factor of an adhesion
contract does not by itself result in '"rocedural unconscionability," it certainly covers one key
element that of an unequal or "imbalanced" bargaining position between the parties. Obviously,
as a young widow with no experience, Tifani was in a much weaker bargaining position than a
major corporation in A.G. Edwards.
The facts supporting the reasons why the bargaining process was unconscionable are
compelling. Continually ignored by both the defendants and the district coust is that the basis for
the Wattenbargers' claims is not the 1993 interactions with Mr. Gillette, or the IRAAgreement,
but rather the annuities transaction and contract that took place more than two years later. At the
time that Tifani filled out and signed the paperwork establishing the FIAs for her children, there
was no oral or written disclosure that the particular contracts would be subject to an arbitration
provision in a different unrelated contract that she may or may have not signed two years
previously. In fact, the arbitration requirement was not even within A.G. Edward's
contemplation at the time the annuities were created.'62 Tifani had no "opportunity" at the time
she agreed to set up the annuities to study the arbitration provision as it would have related to the

'61

The efforts to which A.G. Edwards had to go simply to find the arbitration provision afrer Tifini filed suit
demonstrate conclusively that there was absolutely no disclosure of the arbitration requirement at the time she
entered into the annuity contracts
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annuities. Lovey at 42. Moreover, absolutely nothing in the annuity agreements would have
even put her on notice that there was a second, unrelated agreement requiring arbitration of the
agreements she was about to enter. Thus the arbitration language was beyond "inconspicuous,"
it was non-existent. Id.
Apropos Tifani's inability to review the arbitration requirement "incorporated into" the

1
I

annuity agreements, the defendants allege as to the 1993 IRA Agreement that the arbitration
provision found on page 21 of an "IRA Disclosure Statement . . ." attached to an "IRA Adoption

I

Agreement" applies to conduct and controversies beyond the handling of the IRA. Stitching
together these numerous documents into a tapestry requiring arbitration is something entities Iilce
A.G. Edwards have become expert at to the detriment of all consumers, not just Tifani. This is
I

I
!

not simply a "complex" provision in a "standardized" document, it is simply designed to
mislead consumers. Tifani would have expected the documents accompanying the agreement

!

that she was signing to he about the subject matter for which she was bargaining, not something
else. That the district court would be complicit in enforcing this type of "agreement" is
profoundly disturbing.
Finally, Tifani's total lack of experience and kuowledge in investing should not be
disregarded. Neither should the Court ignore the fact that Tifani, understandably, had no recall
of any such arbitration agreement. Apparently neither did anyone from A.G. Edwards, again,
apparent from the fact that this arbitration cIause was not located or "found" until after the
lawsuit was initiated.
In totality, the bargaining process in regard to the IRA Agreement arbitration clause - as
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it is being applied to the FIAs contracts and all other potential controversies was unfairly and
heavily tilted against Tifani. In fact, a court would have to engage in fictions to conclude that
there was any type of "bargaining" process at all. It was an obscure if not deceptive provision
with major ramifications that Tifani had no real opportunity to understand or bargain for particularly in regard to future contracts. This typifies procedural unconscionability.
The district court's analysis stops after procedural unconscionability and thus
"substantive unconsvionability" now must be taken up the appellate court. The Lovey Court lays
out its elements as follows:
The contract or provision is substantively unconscionable if it is a bargain that no person
in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand and that no
honest and fair pelson would accept on the other. Id. Factors to consider include whether
the contract or provision is one-sided or oppressive. . . .the court must consider the
purpose and effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both parties and the commercial
setting in which the agreement was executed, and the reasonableness of the terms at the
time of contracting.. Id. at 42-43
The literal effect of the arbitration, as applied to any and every "controversy, claim or
issue" between Tiiani and virtually anyone associated with A.G. Edwards (now 'Wells Fargo")
before and after 1993 is a bargain that no one in their right mind would ever accept. Under this
provision, if a former employee of A.G Edwards were to cause the wrongful death of one of
Tifani's children, her case would have to go bei'ore arbitration that would include a "member
organization of the New York Stock Exchange." No person would knowingly deprive
themselves of this kind of due process and access to the courts.
In addition, defendants cannot claim that the IRA Agreement arbitration clause applies to
claims arising from the annuity contracts but not other issues unrelated to the IRA Agreement, or
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in other words try to "qualify" the limitation of the language. This would be inconsistent with
the position that they have taken in attempting to enforce this arbitration clause. Either the scope
of the clause is limited to claims arising out of the IRA agreement, or its scope is unlimited - not
somewhere in between. In fact, the district court adopted the patently absurd position that that
the provision applies to all controversies and claims arising ffom any "event" between the parties
without limitation. The defendants and the district court are in error and have supported an
arbitration clause that is quite evidently unconscionable and therefore invalid as a matter of
public policy.
B. The arbitrationprovision is unconscionable as a matter of consumer protection.
While the courts do favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements, such agreements
should not be enforced at the expense of consumer protection from deceptive or excessively onesided transactions. The appellate court is allowed to conduct a free review of governing statutes
of the issues on appeal, including the statute's legislative intent, i.e. the "language used, the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Kelso & Irwin,

FA. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134,997 P.2d 591,595 (2000).
Idaho's "Consumer Protection Act" bans "Unconscionable Methods, Acts, or Practices."
I.C. 48-603C. The determination of such unconscionable acts or practices include:
Whether the alleged violator knowingly or with reason to know, took advantage of a
consumer reasonable unable to protect his interest because of physical, infirmity,
ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of the agreement or similar
factor. Id. at (2)(a),
Whether the alleged violator lcnowingly or with reason to know induced the consumer to
enter into a transaction that was excessively one-sided in favor of the alleged violator. Id.
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at 2(c), and
Whether the sales conduct or pattern of sales conduct would outrage or offend the public
conscience as determined by the court. Id. at 2(d)
This statute refers to conduct that is directed at the consumer and is "designed to exploit a
particular weakness or disadvantage" of the consumer. Stare v. Daicel Chenz. Indus., LTD., 141
Idaho 102, 109, 106 P.3d 428,435 (2005).
Recently, stock arbitration agreements between consumers and large corporations have
come under increased scrutiny by Congress and consumer protection agencies. The respected
national, non-profit public interest organization Public Citizen recently published a detailed
report entitled: "The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers."
(September 2007, found at http://www.citizen.orgipublications/release.cfm?ID

=7545&secID=1052&catlD=126). This report documents and details the major advantages that
corporations have over consumers in the arbitration process, including the secrecy of the
arbitration proceedings, the financial incentives h t arbitrators receive from corporations that
use them, the costs to consumers and the total lack of safeguards to ensure fairness to the
consumers that would be available in civil court. As a confirmation of these inequities, the report
found in a study of California arbitration decisions that the consumer prevailed only 3.3% of the
time. (See p. 16) In response to these concerns, Congress is currently considering the
"Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009" (S. 93lM.R. 1020) that would prevent arbitration from being
foisted upon consumers through binding, secret and non-negotiable arbitration clauses.
In this case, the arbitration clause that the defendants are attempting to impose on
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Wattenbargers is well within the purview of consumer abuses prohibited under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act and which are trending to be viewed as unfair and deceptive under
public policy. This onerous arbitration clause, as interpreted by the defendants and the district
court, applies to every potential issues or controversy between Tifani and the defendants,
including the defendants' agents. A.G. Edward's conduct was deceptive and provided no real
opportunity or ability for Tifani to understand or know the potential ramifications of such a broad
and wide-ranging agreement.
Moreover, both in its language and practical application, the arbitration provision stacks
the cards against Wattenbargers' claims, or is "excessively one sided." The provision requires a
member of the "New York Stock Exchange, Inc." to sit on the arbitration panel, creating an
automatic conflict of interest (because the defendants are also a member). In practical terms, the
Wattenbargers will have only a 3% chance of prevailing in arbitration. They will not have the
access to due process that is available in civil court and may be before a panel which has a direct
and pecuniary tie to the defendants. Such disadvantages are evidenced by the major investment
in legal fees (over $18,000) by the defendants to try and move the claims to arbitration, even
before they have even filed an answer to the claims.
In considering the "reasonableness of the interpretation" and the "policy behind "the

FAA" in concert with the Consumer Protection Act and public trends, this Court should
invalidate the arbitration clause as unconscionable and against public policy. Kelso & Irwin, PA.
v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134,997 P.2d 591,595. Protecting consumers is an important

responsibility of the court. The defendants' attempted application of the arbitration clause is
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blatantly unfair to Wattenbargers and should not be upheld.

WJH. THE DBSTRlCT COURT ABUSED %TSDISCRETION IN AWAmiIWG
ATTOWEY FEES
The decision to award any costs to the prevailing party is within the discretion of the
court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 128,968 P.2d 215,223 (1998).
Accordingly, when the court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate conrt
considers: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798,
804 (2000).
Although the prevailing party determination is "discretionay in nature, this discretion
must be exercised within the bounds of governing legal standards," and therefore can be a matter
of law. Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322,326, 1 P.3d 823,827 (2000 Ida. App.). For
instance, where the lower court must first interpret a contract to determine if attorney fees are
appropriate before making a discretionary determination as to who is the prevailing party, the
interpretation of the contract is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free
review. Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835 P.2d 677,684 (Ida. App. 1992).
A. The District Courtfailed to perceive the awarding offies as one of discretion
In awarding the defendants fees, the district court failed to conduct any kind of
consideration of the required factors in determining whether a party is entitled to fees under
Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(d)(l)(B).
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The law requires a three factor test in determining whether to award fees:
(1) The final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties; (2) Whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and
(3) to the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues.
Nguyen v,Hoa, 193 P.3d 1107, I1 12 (Ida. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,
940 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1997)

In conducting this analysis, the court must also consi&er"all of the issues involved in the
action and the judgment or judgments obtained" from an "overall view." Nguyen v. Hoa, 193

It is apparent that once the district court declared its decision "hal,"' that was all that was
required in its mind to meet the "prevailing party" standard under the rule, stating:
Even though the matter has yet been resolved on the merits through arbitration, a final
judgment has been entered in this action. . . Consequently, defendants are the prevailing
parties and should be awarded reasonable attorney fees.'63
As required under the mandatoly three factor test under the rule, the district court did not
consider the "final judgment obtained" in relation to "the relief sought" by Wattenbargers.
Indeed, the Wattenbargers have yet to even adjudicate their claims. State v. Jardine, 130 Idaho
3 18, 940 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1997). Further, the district court failed to examine to the extent that
each of the parties prevailed on "each" or "all of the issues" and involved in the action and the
"overall view." Nguyen v. Hoa, 193 P.3d 1107, 1112, 1114. There is no such analysis. The
defendants may have prevailed on switching the forum to arbitration, but they have not prevailed
on any of Wattenbargers' claims - and have not even answered the allegations. It is readily

IG3
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apparent that the district court simply did not understand its discretionary authority, believing
that once it determined there was a "final judgment," fees should be automatically awarded.
Such a truncated analysis is an abuse of its discretion and its award of attorney fees to the
defendants should be overturned.

B. The district courtjailed to apply or misapplied ttie proper legal standard
In determining that the defendants obtained a '%a1 judgment" and thus were the
"prevailing party" the district court failed to follow the law in how to proceed when arbitration
has been ordered. The FAA states that when there is a suit brought in court, and the court agrees
that the claims are subject to arbitration, the court shall ''slay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 USCS $ 3 The Act
further states that upon completion of the arbitration, that the prevailing party can then seek
"judgment of the court." Id. at 5 6. The Courts have made it clear that claimants that are subject
to arbitration do not forgo their substantive rights afforded by statute. Perez. E Globe Airport

. 2001); Cole a Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 323 U.S.
Sec. Servs., Inc. 253 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11 th Clr.
App. D.C. 133, 105 F.3d 1465,1487 (Dist. Col. Ct. App. 1997)
As mentioned previously, the arbitration provision is governed under the FAA. Thus,
pursuant to Section 3 of that Act, rather than issuing a "final judgment" making the Defendants
the "prevailing party," the Court should have delayed such judgment, or "stayed the proceeding"
pending the outcome of the arbitration. Failing to do so has violated Wattenbargers' substantive
rights under the statute, because it has required them to prematurely suffer the consequences of
paying the defendants' attorney fees before having even the opporhmity to adjudicate their
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claims. Perez. v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc. 253 F.3d 1280, 1285 Pulsuant to the FAA, there
has been no final judgment, and therefore no right to even an analysis of whether defendants
should he awarded fees under I.R.C.P. 54(b). The district court's decision to award fees was
premature and should be overturned.
Further, the legal authority cited by the district court was incorrectly applied to the facts
of this case. The Court references Daisy Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc. 134 Idaho, 259,
In PaintbaN the Plaintiffs case was dismissed
261-62,999 P.2d 914,916-17 (Ct. App. 2000).'~~
because they discovered after the action that the defendants were not the "real party in interest."
The court ultimately awarded the defendants their fees because the "defendants could not have
achieved a more favorable outcome." Id. The district court compares the defendants in this case
and the Paintball case, when in fact the results in the two respective cases are entirely different.
In Paintball the Plaintiffs' claims were entirely extinguished because the defendants were "not
the real party in interest." However, in this case not only have Wattenbargers' claims against the
defendants not been terminated by the dismissal of the case, they have yet to be adjudicated. The
defendants are still very much a "party in interest" in this case. Thus the "most favorable
outcome" has not been obtained by the defendants, and Painlball does not apply. The district
court has erred and must be overturned.
C . The District Court erred in determining that there M.~USa conmctual basisfor the
warding offees
Before fees can be awarded under Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(b)-(e) there inust be a

'61
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contractual or statutory basis entitling such fees. Mihalka a Shepard, 145 Idaho 547,550, 181
T93d 473,476 (2008). The district court rejected the defendants' statutory basis for fees, instead
relying on the IRA Agreement:
Any expense, including attorney's fees, incurred by the Custodian in defense in an action
brought by the Depositor seeking rescission of any agreement between the Depositor and
the Custodian or to recover damages for the uctivities.ofthe Custodian or its agenis or
employees in handling any account of the Depositor shall be bo~nesolely by the account,
or the Depositor as the case may be, should the Custodian prevail. (Emphasis added)165
The appellate court can review "de novo" whether this contract language does require the
Wattenbargers to pay attorney fees when all the defendants have accomplished is to compel
arbitration. Badell v Budell, 122 Idaho 442,449,835 P.2d 677,684
As discussed, supra, the Wattenbargers' claims are not based on the IRAAgreement.
Therefore, there is no contractual basis for attorney fees. In any case, the defendants have not
"prevailed" on the Wattenbargers "action" to "recover damages" for the defendants "activities"
in "handling" of the accounts. In fact, the "action" has yet to be adjudicated. At best, defendants
have only succeeded to have the "action" transferred to arbitration, nothing more. In fact, since
the IRAAgreement contemplates that all disputes are only to be considered through arbitration,
its language only applies to arbitration procedures. Because arbitration has not occurred, there
has been no "action" under the contract. The defendants are not entitled to their attorney fees.

D. The amount offees awarded by the District Court is unreasonable
Idaho Rule of Civ Pro 54(e)(3) sets forth mandatory a 12 factor test in determining the

'65
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appropriate amount of attorney fees that should be awarded. With no explanation, the District
Court accepted "cart blanche" the defendants' request of $15,139,41 in attorney fees. This
amount seems extraordinarily high for what should have been a straight forward motion on
whether Wattenbargers had agreed to arbitrate their claims. The defendants' attorneys had
submitted a 23 page summary of "legal services" dated from January 9,2008 though December
12,2008.

The defendants' "Motion to Dismiss" was not filed until October 10,2008. Even a

cursory review of these legal services by the Court would have indicated several thousand dollars
incurred in legal fees over a several month period to 1) research the company files to determine
exactly what documents existed, 2) engage in lengthy internal conversations and memorandums
in regard to those files and 3) exhaustive investigation as to whether arbitration provisions in
these documents were even legally enforceable.16' Approximately $2,500 in fees was incurred
over a several month period just in the drafting, re-drafting and editing the affidavit of Gene
~illette.'~'The defendants' extensive "fact finding" and internal communications regard those
facts should not be a cost covered by the Wattenbargers. In any case, the Court simply failed
conduct its mandatory analysis about the appropriateness of the award, which should be
overturned.

E. The district court's awarding offies is unreasonable and unjust.
What should not be forgotten in this analysis is the underlying basis for the execution of

See Bumett Aff. R. Vol. 111, pp. 203-260
I6l

Id.
Id.
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any of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as stated in Rule l(a):
These mles shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. Idaho Rule of Civ Pro l(a)
As this concept of justice applies to the determination of the "right" of a "prevailing party" to be
awarded costs under 1.R.G.P 54(d), the Court must conduct a "careful consideration of the
relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and without arbitrary disregard for those
kcts and principles of justice." Decker v. Homeguard Sys., 105 Idaho 158, 161 (Ida. App. 1983)

In awarding fees, the district court has apparently neglected this essential principle of
justice and efficiency. The Wattenbargers are private citizens, a married couple with limited
resources who believe that they have legitimate claims against a corporation with almodt
unlimited resources. They have a right to have those claims heard. The obvious objective of the
defendants is to use whatever resources necessary to prevent the Wattenbargers from having their
claims adjudicated in a fair forum or in any forum. The defendants' motion to seek a recovery of
their fees after only succeeding to have the claims removed to arbitration was nothing short of an
attempt to create more costs for the plaintiffs to deter them pursuing these claims.
The district court should have recognized and rejected this ulterior motive and tactics.
The district court should have also considered the circumstances, including the un-equal position
of the parties. Instead, the awarding of the fees has left Wattenbargers with no choice but to
undergo the expensive, time-consuming and arduous appeals process and to pay the defendants,
including this massive corporation in Wells Fargo their fees even before their claims have been
heard. This is not the "just, speedy, determination" of proceedings required under Rule 1(A), and
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is in fact the utter "disregard" Tor the "facts and principles of justice." Decker v. Homegzbard Sys.,
105 Idaho 158, 161. The justice system should be used as a fair and ef6cienl opportunity to
adjudicate claims, not as a means to prevail by mere attrition. This injustice should be
overturned.

CONCLLUSIION
For the foregoing reasons, Tifani and Jared Wattenbarger respectfully requests that the
district court's order be overturned and remanded to apply the summa~yjudgment standard of
review and the correct interpretation of the arbitration clause, or alternatively that as a matter of
law that Wattenbargers' claims are not within the scope ofthe arbitration provision or that the
arbitration provision is invalid for public policy reasons.
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